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Abstract 
Every year during the second and thirdquarters (the “hot season”) housing markets in the UK 
and the US experience systematic above-trend increases in both prices and transactions. 
During the fourth and first quarters (the “cold season”), house prices and transactions fall 
below trend. We propose a search-and-matching framework that sheds new light on the 
mechanisms governing housing market fluctuations. The model has a “thick-market” eﬀect 
that can generate substantial diﬀerences in the volume of transactions and prices across 
seasons, with the extent of seasonality in prices depending crucially on the bargaining power 
of sellers. The model can quantitatively mimic the seasonal fluctuations in transactions and 
prices observed in the UK and the US. 
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ISBN 978-0-85328-375-1 1 Introduction
A rich empirical and theoretical literature has been motivated by dramatic boom-to-bust episodes
in regional and national housing markets.1 Booms are typically deﬁned as times when prices rise
and there is intense trading activity, whereas busts are times when prices and trading activity fall
below trend.
While the boom-to-bust episodes motivating the extant work are relatively infrequent and of
unpredictable timing, this paper shows that in several housing markets, booms and busts are just
as frequent and predictable as the seasons. In particular, in most regions of the UK and the US,
every year a housing boom of considerable magnitude takes place in the second and third quarters
of the calendar year (the “hot season”), followed by a bust in the fourth and ﬁrst quarters (the
“cold season”). The predictable nature of house price ﬂuctuations (and transactions) is furthermore
conﬁrmed by estate agents, who in conversations with the authors observed that during winter
months there is less activity and “owners tend to sell at a discount.” Perhaps more compelling,
publishers of house price indexes go to great lengths to produce seasonally adjusted versions of their
indexes, usually the index that is published in the media. As stated by publishers:
“House prices are higher at certain times of the year irrespective of the overall trend. This tends
to be in spring and summer, when more buyers are in the market and hence sellers do not need
to discount prices so heavily in order to achieve a sale,” and “...we seasonally adjust our prices
because the time of year has some inﬂuence. Winter months tend to see weaker price rises and
spring/summer see higher increases all other things being equal.” (From Nationwide House Price
Index Methodology.)
“Houses prices are seasonal with prices varying during the course of the year irrespective of the
underlying trend in price movements. For example, prices tend to be higher in the spring and summer
months when more people are looking to buy.” (From Halifax Price Index Methodology.)
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to systematically document the existence and quantitative
importance of these seasonal booms and busts.2 For the UK as a whole, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence
1See for example Stein (1995), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), Genesove and Mayer (2001), Krainer (2001),
Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008), and the contributions cited therein.
2Studies on housing markets have typically glossed over the issue of seasonality. There are a few exceptions, albeit
they have been conﬁned to only one aspect of seasonality (e.g., either quantities or prices) or to a relatively small
geographical area. In particular, Goodman (1993) documents pronounced seasonality in moving patterns in the US,
Case and Shiller (1989) ﬁnd seasonality in prices in Chicago and–to a lesser extent–in Dallas, and Hosios and
Pesando (1991) ﬁnd seasonality in prices in the City of Toronto; the latter conclude “that individuals who are willing
2in annualized growth rates between hot and cold seasons is above 8 percent for nominal prices (6
percent for real prices) and 108 percent for transactions. For the US as a whole, the corresponding
diﬀerences are above 3 percent for nominal (and real) prices and 148 percent for transactions, though
there is considerable variation within the country (particularly for prices).
The predictability and size of seasonal ﬂuctuations in house prices poses a challenge to standard
models of durable-good markets. In those models, anticipated changes in prices cannot be large:
If prices are expected to be much higher in May than in December, then buyers will shift their
purchases to the end of the year, narrowing down the seasonal price diﬀerential. More concretely, a
typical no-arbitrage condition states that seasonality in prices must be accompanied by seasonality
in rental ﬂows or in the cost of housing services. Rents, however, display no seasonality, implying
a substantial and, as we shall argue, unrealistic degree of seasonality in service costs.3,4 A possible
explanation for why standard no-arbitrage conditions fail is of course that transaction costs are
very high and hence investors do not beneﬁt from arbitrage. Still, the question remains as to why
presumably informed buyers do not try to buy in the low-price season. Furthermore, it is not clear
why we observe a systematic seasonal pattern. (The lack of scope for seasonal arbitrage does not
necessarily imply that most transactions should be carried out in one season, nor does it imply
that prices and transactions should be correlated.) To oﬀer answers to these questions, we develop
a search-and-matching model for the housing market. The model more realistically captures the
process of buying and selling houses and it can more generally shed new light on the mechanisms
governing housing market ﬂuctuations.
The model starts from the premise that the utility potential buyers derive from a house is match-
speciﬁc; so, for example, two individuals visiting the same house may attach a diﬀerent value to
it and hence have diﬀerent willingness to pay. In that context, buyers are more likely to ﬁnd a
higher-quality match (and thus their willingness to pay is more likely to increase) when there are
to purchase against the seasonal will, on average, do considerably better.”
3For example, the degree of price seasonality observed in the UK implies that service costs should be at least 200
percent higher in the “cold” season than in the “hot” season–see Appendix 7.2. This seems unlikely, particularly
because interest rates and tax rates, two major components of service costs, display no seasonality.
4Seasonality in housing markets does not seem to be driven by seasonal diﬀerences in liquidity related to overall
income. Income is typically high in the last quarter, a period in which house prices and the volume of transactions
tend to fall below trend. Beaulieu and Miron (1992) and Beaulieu, Miron, and MacKie-Mason (1992) show that in
most countries, including the UK and the US, income peaks in the fourth quarter of the calendar year. There is also
a seasonal peak in output in the second quarter, and seasonal recessions in the ﬁrst and third quarters. House price
seasonality thus is not in line with income seasonality: Prices are above trend in the second and third quarters.
3more houses for sale. Hence, in a thick market (or hot season), sellers can charge higher prices.5
Because prices are higher, potential sellers are more willing to sell their houses, better matches are
formed, willingness to pay increases, and so on. This mechanism thus leads to a higher number of
transactions and prices in the hot season.
I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,w ed i s t i n g u i s hs e a s o n sb yd i ﬀerences in the ex-ante propensity to move.
These diﬀerences may arise, for example, from the school calendar: Families may prefer to move in
the summer, before sending their children to new schools, or from other factors, such as weather.
These diﬀerences alone, however, are too small to explain the full extent of seasonality we document.6
Most of the explanatory power of the model is due to the match-quality eﬀect. We show that a
slightly higher ex-ante probability of moving in a given season can trigger thick-market eﬀects that
make it appealing to a large number of agents to buy and sell during that season. This ampliﬁcation
mechanism can create substantial seasonality in transactions; the extent of seasonality in prices, in
turn, increases with the bargaining power of sellers. Intuitively better matches in the hot season
imply higher surpluses to be shared between buyers and sellers; to the extent that sellers have
some bargaining power, this leads to higher prices in the hot season. The calibrated model can
quantitatively account for most of the seasonal ﬂuctuations in transactions and prices in the UK
and the US.7
The contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, it systematically documents
seasonal booms and busts in housing markets; it argues that the predictability and high extent of
seasonality in prices cannot be quantitatively reconciled with the standard asset-pricing equilibrium
condition embedded in most models of housing markets (or consumer durables, more generally).
Second, it develops a search-and-matching model that can quantitatively account for the seasonal
patterns of prices and transactions observed in the UK and the US. The model is more general than
its current application and can be adapted to study lower-frequency movements in house prices and
transactions.
5The labor literature distinguishes the thick-market eﬀects due to faster arrival of oﬀers and those due to the
quality of the match. Our focus is entirely on the quality eﬀect. See for example Diamond (1981) and Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2006) and Gautier and Teulings (2008).
6For example, parents of school-age children account for only a small fraction of total movers. (See Goodman, 1993.)
And although weather may make house search more convenient in the summer, it is unlikely that this convenience is
w o r t hs om u c hm o n e yt ot h et y p i c a lb u y e r .
7Our focus on these two countries is largely driven by the reliability and quality of the data.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence. Section 3 introduces
the model. Section 4 presents the qualitative results and a quantitative analysis of the model,
confronting it with the empirical evidence. Section 5 discusses the eﬃciency properties of the model
and studies the robustness of the results to alternative modelling assumptions. Section 6 presents
concluding remarks. Analytical derivations and proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Hot and Cold Seasons
In this Section we study seasonality in housing markets in the US and the UK at diﬀerent levels
of geographic disaggregation.8 As said, publishers of house price indexes produce both seasonally
adjusted (SA) and non-seasonally adjusted (NSA) series.9 In Appendix 7.1 we report the seasonal
component implied by their adjustment. In our analysis, we use exclusively the (raw) NSA series to
compute the extent of seasonality.
2.1 Data
UK
In the UK two main sources provide quality-adjusted NSA house price indexes: One is the Depart-
ment of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and the other is Halifax, one of the country’s
largest mortgage lenders.10 Both sources report regional price indexes on a quarterly basis for the
12 standard planning regions of the UK, as well as for the UK as a whole. The indexes calculated
8We focus on the US and the UK because of the availability of quality-adjusted price data in both countries. This
mitigates any concern with compositional changes in the types of houses transacted across seasons. Results for other
countries are available from the authors. (Though we ﬁnd qualitatively similar seasonal patterns in other countries,
we are less conﬁdent about the comparability of the data, as typically they are not quality adjusted.)
9The US National Association of Realtors also produces NSA and SA data for transactions.
10Other price publishers, like Nationwide Building Society, report quality adjusted data but they are already
SA (the NSA data are not publicly available). Nationwide Building Society, however, reports in its methodology
description that June is generally the strongest month for house prices and January is the weakest; this justiﬁes the
SA they perform in the published series. In a somewhat puzzling paper, Rosenthal (2006) argues that seasonality
in Nationwide Building Society data is elusive; we could not, however, gain access to the NSA data to assess which
of the two conﬂicting assessments (Nationwide Building Society’s or Rosenthal’s) was correct. We should perhaps
also mention that Rosenthal (2006) also reaches very diﬀerent conclusions from Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) with
regards to lower-frequency movements. Finally, the Land Registry data reports average prices, without adjusting for
quality.
5are ‘standardized’ and represent the price of a typically transacted house. The standardization is
based on hedonic regressions that control for a number of characteristics, including location, type of
property (house, sub-classiﬁed according to whether it is detached, semi-detached or terraced, bun-
galow, ﬂat), age of the property, tenure (freehold, leasehold, feudal), number of rooms (habitable
rooms, bedrooms, living-rooms, bathrooms), number of separate toilets, central heating (none, full,
partial), number of garages and garage spaces, garden, land area, road charge liability, etc. These
controls adjust for the possibility of seasonal changes in the composition of the set of properties (for
example, shifts in the location or sizes of properties).
The two sources diﬀer in three respects. First, DCLG collects information from a sample of all
mortgage lenders in the country, while the Halifax index uses all the data from Halifax mortgages
only, which account for an average of 25 percent of the market (re-mortgages and further advances
are excluded in both cases). Second, DCLG reports the price at the time of completion of the
transaction, while Halifax reports the price at the time of approval of the mortgage. Completion
takes on average three to four weeks following the initial agreement, but some agreed transactions do
not reach completion. Finally, the DCLG index goes back to 1963 for certain regions, while Halifax
starts in 1983.
To compute real price indexes, we later deﬂate the house price indexes using the NSA retail price
index (RPI) provided by the UK Oﬃce for National Statistics.
As an indicator of the number of transactions, we use the number of mortgages advanced for
home purchases; the data are collected by the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) and are also
disaggregated by region.
US
T h em a i ns o u r c eo fN S Ah o u s ep r i c ei n d e x e sf o rt h eU Si sO F H E O ;w ef o c u so nt h ep u r c h a s e - o n l y
index, which starts in 1991:01. This is a repeat-sale index calculated for the whole of the US and
also disaggregated by Census regions and states. The repeat-sale index, introduced by Case and
Shiller (1987), measures average price changes in repeat sales of the same properties; as such, the
index is designed to control for the quality of the homes sold. We also study the Case-Shiller index
carried out by Standard & Poor’s for 20 big cities and a composite of major cities; this index is also
a repeat-sale, purchase-only and starts in 1987:01.
To compute real price indexes, we use the NSA consumer price index (CPI) provided by the US
6Bureau of Labor Statistics.11
Data on the number of transactions come from the National Association of Realtors (NAR), and
correspond to the number of sales of existing single-family homes. The data are disaggregated into
the four major Census regions.
2.2 Extent of Seasonality
We focus our study on deterministic seasonality, which is easier to understand (and to predict) for
buyers and sellers (unlikely to be all econometricians), and hence most puzzling from a theoretical
point of view. In the UK and the US, the average quarterly growth rates in prices in both the
s e c o n da n dt h i r dq u a r t e r sa r ea b o v et h ea v e r a g eg r o w t hr a t e sf o rt h ep e r i o d sw ea n a l y z e ,w h i l et h e
quarterly growth rates in both fourth and ﬁrst quarters are below average. For ease of exposition, we
group data into two broadly deﬁned seasons–second and third quarter, or “hot season”, and fourth
and ﬁrst quarter, or “cold season”. (We use interchangeably the terms hot season and summer term
to refer to the second and third quarters and cold season and winter term to refer to the ﬁrst and
fourth quarters.)
In the next set of Figures, we depict in dark (red) bars the average (annualized) price increase





,w h e r ePS is the price index at the end of the hot season and PW
is the price at the end of the cold season. Correspondingly, we depict in light (blue) bars the average





,w h e r ePW0 is the price index at the
end of the cold season of the following year. We plot similar Figures for transactions.
The extent of seasonality for each geographical unit can then be measured as the diﬀerence
between the two bars. This measure nets out lower-frequency ﬂuctuations aﬀecting both seasons.
(In the model we later present, we use a similar metric to gauge the extent of seasonality.)
2.2.1 Housing Market Seasonality in the UK
Nominal and Real House Prices Figure 1 reports the average annualized percent price
increases in the summer term and the winter term from 1983 through to 2007 using the regional
price indexes provided by DCLG. During the period analyzed, the average nominal price increases
in the winter term were below 5 p e r c e n ti na l lr e g i o n se x c e p tf o rNorthern Ireland. In the summer
11As it turns out, there is little seasonality in the US CPI index, a ﬁnding ﬁr s td o c u m e n t e db yB a r s k ya n dM i r o n
(1989), and hence the seasonal patterns in nominal and real housing prices coincide. The CPI is reported at monthly
frequency. We take the last month of the quarter to deﬂate nominal prices.
7term, the average growth rates were above 12 percent in all regions, except for Northern Ireland,
East Anglia, and the North East. As shown in the graph, the diﬀerences in growth rates across the
two broad seasons are generally very large and economically signiﬁcant, with an average of 9 percent
for all regions. (For some regions, the DCLG index goes back to 1968, and though the average
growth rates are lower in the longer period, the average diﬀerence across seasons is still very high at
above 8 percent.12)



























Note: Annualized price growth rates in summers (second and third quarters) and winters (fourth and first quarters) in 
the U.K. and its regions. DCLG, 1983-2007.
winter summer
The patterns are qualitatively similar when we use the Halifax index, not reported here in the
interest of space (results are available from the authors). The annualized average price growth during
the summer term is above 11 percent in all regions, with the exception of the North East and West
Midlands, whereas the increase during the winter term is systematically below 5 percent, except for
the North East region and London, where the increase is just above 5 percent. The average diﬀerence
in growth rates across seasons is 7.4 percent. There are some non-negligible quantitative diﬀerences
between the two sources, which might be partly explained by diﬀerences in coverage and by the lag
between approval and completion, which, as mentioned, is one important diﬀerence between the two
indexes. The two sources, however, point to a similar pattern of prices surging in the summer and
stagnating in the winter.
12Results are available from the authors. We start in 1983 for comparability with the Halifax series.
8The previous discussion was based on the seasonal pattern of nominal house prices. The seasonal
pattern of real house prices (that is, house prices relative to the overall NSA price index) depends also
on the seasonality of overall inﬂation. In the UK, overall price inﬂation displays some seasonality.
The diﬀerence in overall inﬂation rates across the two seasons, however, can hardly “undo” the
diﬀerences in nominal house price inﬂation, implying a signiﬁcant seasonal also in real house prices.
(See Figure 2.) Netting out the eﬀect of overall inﬂation reduces the diﬀerences in growth rates
between winters and summers to a country-wide average of 7.3 percent using the DCLG series and
5.6 using the Halifax series. We also looked at more disaggregated data, distinguishing between
ﬁrst-time buyers and former-owner occupiers, as well as purchases of new houses versus existing
houses. Seasonal patterns were similar across the various groups; in the interest of space, we do not
report the results here, but they are available upon request.


























Note: Annualized real price growth rates in summers (second and third quarters) and winters (fourth and first quarters) 
in the U.K. and its regions. DCLG, 1983-2007.
winter summer
Number of Transactions
Seasonal ﬂuctuations in house prices are accompanied by qualitatively similar ﬂuctuations in the
number of transactions, proxied here by the number of mortgages. For comparability with the price
sample, Figure 3 shows the growth rates in the number of mortgages in the two seasons from 1983
to 2007. (The data, which are compiled by CML, goes back to 1974 for some regions; the patterns
9are qualitatively similar in the earlier period.) As the Figure shows, the number of transactions
increases sharply in the summer term and accordingly declines in the winter term.
























Note: Annualized growth rates in the number of transactions in summers (second and third quarters) and winters (fourth 
and first quarters) in the U.K. and its regions. CML, 1983-2007.
winter summer
Statistical Signiﬁcance of the Diﬀerences between Summers and Winters











, using a t-test on the equality of means.13 Tables 1 through 3 report the
average diﬀerence in growth rates across seasons and standard errors, together with the statistical
signiﬁcance. Table 1 reports the results for prices, both nominal and real, for all regions, using the
data from DCLG and Table 2 shows the corresponding information using Halifax. Table 3 shows
13The test on the equality of means is equivalent to the t-test on the slope coeﬃcient from a regression of annualized
growth rates on a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation falls on the second and third quarter and
0 otherwise. The dummy coeﬃcient captures the annualized diﬀerence across the two seasons, regardless of the
frequency of the data (provided growth rates are annualized). To see this note that the annualized growth rate
















































. Hence a regression with quarterly (or semester) data on a
summer dummy will produce an unbiased estimate of the average diﬀerence in growth rates across seasons. We use
quarterly data to exploit all the information and gain on degrees of freedom.
10the diﬀerences in transactions’ growth rates.
Table 1:D i ﬀerence in annualized percentage changes in (nominal and real)
house prices between summers and winters in the UK, by region. DCLG.
Region Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
East Anglia 6.536* (3.577) 4.870 (3.461)
East Midlands 8.231** (3.148) 6.408** (3.131)
Gr. London 8.788*** (3.273) 6.966** (3.372)
North East 8.511** (3.955) 6.845* (3.915)
North West 13.703*** (3.323) 12.583*** (3.245)
Northern Ireland 4.237 (3.431) 2.415 (3.467)
Scotland 10.393*** (2.793) 8.571*** (2.711)
South East 10.375*** (3.496) 8.709** (3.301)
South West 11.244*** (3.419) 9.422*** (3.459)
Wales 7.180** (3.504) 5.358 (3.442)
West Midlands 9.623*** (3.089) 7.801** (3.070)
Yorkshire & the Humber 10.148*** (3.114) 8.325*** (3.056)
United Kingdom 9.008*** (2.304) 7.185*** (2.314)
Nominal house price Real house price
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by region for 
1983-2007. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: 
Department of Communities and Local Government.
Table 2:D i ﬀerence in annualized percentage changes in (nominal and real)
house prices between summers and winters in the UK, by region. Halifax.
Region Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
East Anglia 9.885*** (3.604) 8.081** (3.706)
East Midlands 10.247*** (3.393) 8.444** (3.413)
Gr. London 5.696* (3.048) 3.892 (3.221)
North East 2.197 (2.945) 0.394 (2.864)
North West 8.019*** (2.653) 6.216** (2.548)
Northern Ireland 6.053* (3.409) 4.25 (3.494)
Scotland 9.334*** (2.320) 7.530*** (2.272)
South East 7.104** (3.019) 5.301* (3.149)
South West 9.258** (3.474) 7.454** (3.549)
Wales 7.786** (3.329) 5.983* (3.288)
West Midlands 5.987* (3.540) 4.183 (3.505)
Yorkshire & the Humber 7.253** (2.892) 5.450* (2.825)
United Kingdom 7.559*** (2.365) 5.756** (2.400)
Nominal house price Real house price
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by region for 
1983-2007. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: 
Halifax.
11Table 3:D i ﬀerence in annualized percentage changes in the volume of
transactions between summers and winters in the UK, by region. CML.
Region Difference Std. Error
East Anglia 119.420*** (11.787)
East Midlands 104.306*** (11.151)
Gr. London 99.758*** (11.577)
North East 84.069*** (9.822)
North West 103.525*** (8.963)
Northern Ireland 71.466*** (12.228)
Scotland 116.168*** (9.843)
South East 117.929*** (9.710)
South West 110.996*** (8.764)
Wales 115.900*** (13.850)
West Midlands 112.945*** (9.496)
Yorkshire & the Humber 98.904*** (8.192)
United Kingdom 107.745*** (8.432)
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors) by region for 
1983-2007. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Source: Council of Mortgage Lenders.
The diﬀerences in price increases across seasons are quite sizable for most regions, in the order of
7 to 9 percent on average in nominal terms (depending on whether DCLG or Halifax data are used)
and 5.7 to 7 percent in real terms; the results from DCLG appear more signiﬁcant than those from
Halifax from a statistical point of view. For transactions, the diﬀerences reach 108 percent for the
country as a whole. Put together, the data point to a strong seasonal cycle, with a large increase
in transactions and prices during the summer relative to the winter term. Also, seasonal patterns,
particularly in transactions, are qualitatively similar across all regions.
Rents and Mortgage Rates Data on rents are not well documented. Only in recent years
have data collection eﬀorts started, but there is no long enough time-series to detect seasonality.14
One source that can serve at least as indicative, is the average registered private rents collected
by the UK Housing and Construction Statistics; the data run on a quarterly basis from 1979:01 to
2001:04. We run regressions using as dependent variables both the rent levels and the log of rents on
a dummy variable taking value 1 in the second and third quarters and 0 otherwise, detrending the
data in diﬀerent ways. The data showed no deterministic seasonality (regression outcomes available
from the authors). This is in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that rents are fairly sticky.
Given the paucity of data on rents, there is little we can say with high conﬁdence. Still, note that
for rents to be the driver of price seasonality, one would need an enormous degree of seasonality in
rents (as well as a high discount rate), since prices should in principle, according to the standard
14See new data produced by the Chartered Institute of Housing since 1999 and ONS since 1996.
12asset-pricing approach, reﬂect the present values of all future rents (in other words, prices should be
less seasonal than rents). The lack of even small discernible levels of seasonality in the data suggests
that we need alternative explanations for the observed seasonality in prices.
Interest rates in the UK do not exhibit a seasonal pattern, at least in the last four decades of data.
We investigated seasonality in diﬀerent interest rate series provided by the Bank of England: The
repo (base) rate; an average interest rate charged by the four UK major banks–before the crisis
(Barclays Bank, Lloyds Bank, HSBC, and National Westminster Bank); and a weighted average
standard variable mortgage rate from banks and Building Societies. None of the interest rate series
displays seasonality (results available from the authors).
Housing Market Seasonality in the US
Nominal and Real House Prices
Figure 4 illustrates the annualized nominal house price increases for diﬀerent regions from OFHEO.
Figure 5 shows the corresponding plot for diﬀerent states, also from OFHEO, and Figure 6 shows
the plot using the S&P’s Case-Shiller indexes for major cities. One ﬁrst observation is that for most
US regions, states and cities, the seasonal pattern is qualitatively similar to that in the UK, albeit
the extent of seasonality is generally smaller. For some of the US major cities, however, the degree
of seasonality is comparable to that in the UK.























Note: Annualized price growth rates in summers (second and third quarters) and winters (fourth and first quarters) in 
the U.S. and its regions. OFHEO, 1991-2007.
winter summer






























































Note: Annualized price growth rates in summers (second and third quarters) and winters (fourth and first quarters) by 
U.S. state. OFHEO, 1991-2007.
winter summer
































Note: Annualized price growth rates in summers (second and third quarters) and winters (fourth and first quarters) by 
U.S. city. S&P Case and Shiller, 1987-2007.
winter summer
14The results using real prices (in terms of diﬀerences between seasons) are virtually identical to the
ones for nominal prices, as CPI inﬂation rates hardly diﬀer across seasons over the period analyzed
and hence the diﬀerences in real growth rates across seasons are almost identical to the diﬀerences
in nominal growth rates. These diﬀerences are later summarized in Table 4. (Figures are omitted
in the interest of space, but are available from the authors).
Transactions Figure 7 shows the annualized growth rates in the number of transactions from
1991 through to 2007 for main Census regions; the data come from NAR.15 Seasonality in trans-
actions is overwhelming: The volume of transactions rises sharply in the summer and falls in the
winter, by even larger magnitudes than in the UK.



















Note: Annualized price growth rates in summers (second and third quarters) and winters (fourth and first quarters) in 
the U.S. and its regions. NAR 1991-2007.
winter summer
Statistical Signiﬁcance of the Diﬀerences between Summers and Winters We sum-
marize the diﬀerences in growth rates across seasons and report the results from a test on mean
15The series actually starts in 1989, but we use 1991 for comparability with the OFHEO-census-level division price
series; adding these two years does not change the results.
15diﬀerences in Tables 4 through 7. Table 4 shows the results for prices using OFHEO’s Census-division
level; Table 5 shows the results using OFHEO’s state-level data; Table 6 shows the results using
S&P’s Case-Shiller city-level data; and Table 7 shows the results for transactions from NAR.
Regarding house prices, for the US as a whole, the diﬀerences in annualized growth rates (nominal
a n dr e a l )a r ei nt h eo r d e ro f3 percent. There is considerable variation across regions, with some
displaying virtually no seasonality (South Atlantic) and others (East and West North Central, New
England and Middle Atlantic) displaying signiﬁcant levels of seasonality. This variability becomes
more evident at the state level. Interestingly, the Case-Shiller index for cities displays higher levels
of seasonality, comparable to the levels observed in UK regions. (This will be consistent with our
model, which, ceteris paribus, generates more seasonality when the bargaining power of sellers is
higher, as it is likely to be the case in cities, where land is relatively scarce.)
The volume of transactions is extremely seasonal in the US, even more than in the UK, with an
average diﬀerence in growth rates across seasons of 148 percent and the pattern in common to all
regions.
Table 4:D i ﬀerence in annualized percentage changes in house prices between
semesters (second-third quarters vis-à-vis fourth-ﬁrst quarters) in the US, by region
Region Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
East North Central 4.262*** (0.772) 4.106*** (0.924)
East South Central 1.811*** (0.535) 1.654** (0.701)
Middle Atlantic 4.273** (1.619) 4.116** (1.660)
Mountain 3.166** (1.205) 3.009** (1.281)
New England 4.980** (2.081) 4.823** (2.181)
Pacific 3.010 (2.117) 2.853 (2.195)
South Atlantic 1.281 (1.277) 1.125 (1.370)
West North Central 4.333*** (0.743) 4.176*** (0.872)
West South Central 2.836*** (0.537) 2.679*** (0.650)
USA 3.169*** (0.967) 3.012*** (1.081)
Nominal house price Real house price
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by region for 1991-2007. 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: OFHEO Purchase-only 
Index.
16Table 5:D i ﬀerence in annualized percentage changes in house prices between
semesters (second-third quarters vis-à-vis fourth-ﬁrst quarters) by US state.
State Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
Alabama 3.812** (1.400) 3.655** (1.378)
Alaska 2.189*** (0.692) 2.032** (0.848)
Arizona 2.263** (0.848) 2.106** (0.950)
Arkansas 1.109 (2.586) 0.953 (2.583)
California 3.656 (3.398) 3.499 (3.479)
Colorado 4.285*** (1.323) 4.129*** (1.447)
Connecticut 5.819*** (2.055) 5.662** (2.133)
District of Columbia 11.040** (4.229) 10.883** (4.150)
Delaware 2.687 (1.862) 2.530 (1.925)
Florida 1.185 (2.525) 1.028 (2.571)
Georgia 1.921** (0.743) 1.764* (0.887)
Hawaii 0.850 (3.668) 0.693 (3.677)
Idaho 4.440*** (0.615) 4.283*** (0.711)
Illinois 5.035*** (1.659) 4.878*** (1.688)
Indiana 3.864*** (0.755) 3.707*** (0.859)
Iowa 3.621*** (0.768) 3.464*** (0.884)
Kansas 3.134*** (0.709) 2.977*** (0.925)
Kentucky 1.623*** (0.570) 1.466** (0.707)
Louisiana 2.300*** (0.827) 2.143** (0.921)
Maine 4.823** (2.219) 4.666* (2.339)
Maryland 3.384 (2.341) 3.227 (2.396)
Massachusetts 4.407** (2.146) 4.250* (2.231)
Michigan 4.573*** (1.568) 4.416** (1.698)
Minnesota 5.290*** (1.376) 5.133*** (1.484)
Missouri 4.085*** (0.646) 3.929*** (0.758)
Mississippi 1.379 (1.028) 1.222 (1.108)
Montana 3.957** (1.469) 3.800** (1.510)
North Carolina 1.417** (0.641) 1.260 (0.764)
North Dakota 4.908*** (1.353) 4.751*** (1.423)
Nebraska 3.842*** (1.082) 3.685*** (1.162)
New Hampshire 4.918** (2.391) 4.761* (2.463)
New Jersey 4.197* (2.076) 4.041* (2.126)
New Mexico 2.857* (1.560) 2.700 (1.623)
Nevada 3.540 (2.946) 3.383 (3.026)
New York 4.662** (1.815) 4.505** (1.872)
Ohio 3.729*** (0.731) 3.572*** (0.911)
Oklahoma 3.095*** (0.477) 2.938*** (0.511)
Oregon 3.903*** (1.380) 3.746*** (1.310)
Pennsylvania 4.226*** (1.317) 4.069*** (1.329)
Rhode Island 3.544 (2.842) 3.388 (2.969)
South Carolina 1.360* (0.698) 1.203 (0.771)
South Dakota 4.201*** (1.171) 4.044*** (1.248)
Tennessee 1.759** (0.685) 1.602* (0.834)
Texas 3.045*** (0.674) 2.888*** (0.763)
Utah 2.204 (1.820) 2.047 (1.803)
Virginia 1.873 (1.758) 1.716 (1.835)
Vermont 5.945** (2.430) 5.788** (2.373)
Washington 3.563** (1.377) 3.406** (1.377)
Wisconsin 5.007*** (0.738) 4.850*** (0.848)
West Virginia 3.753** (1.702) 3.596** (1.765)
Wyoming 5.091*** (1.365) 4.935*** (1.391)
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by state for 1991-
2007. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: OFHEO 
Purchase-only Index.
Nominal house price Real house price
17Table 6:D i ﬀerence in annualized percentage changes in house prices between
semesters (second-third quarters vis-à-vis fourth-ﬁrst quarters) by US city.
City Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
AZ-Phoenix 3.571 (3.307) 3.405 (3.357)
CA-Los Angeles 7.273** (3.478) 6.884* (3.535)
CA-San Diego 7.107** (3.204) 6.717** (3.275)
CA-San Francisco 8.051** (3.009) 7.662** (3.045)
CO-Denver 5.576*** (1.599) 5.186*** (1.805)
DC-Washington 6.439** (2.604) 6.050** (2.645)
FL-Miami 0.636 (2.744) 0.246 (2.838)
FL-Tampa 2.171 (2.384) 1.781 (2.484)
GA-Atlanta 3.920*** (0.903) 3.763*** (1.042)
IL-Chicago 5.530*** (1.342) 5.141*** (1.459)
MA-Boston 8.560*** (2.091) 8.170*** (2.325)
MI-Detroit 3.864* (1.909) 3.707* (2.060)
MN-Minneapolis 4.431*** (1.528) 4.265** (1.741)
NC-Charlotte 3.968*** (0.721) 3.578*** (0.836)
NV-Las Vegas 4.149 (3.216) 3.76 (3.262)
NY-New York 4.477** (2.161) 4.087* (2.342)
OH-Cleveland 6.942*** (0.973) 6.553*** (1.041)
OR-Portland 5.551*** (1.485) 5.161*** (1.388)
TX-Dallas 6.776*** (1.380) 6.138*** (1.823)
WA-Seattle 8.437*** (1.953) 8.175*** (1.942)
Composite-20 cities 6.051*** (2.227) 5.662** (2.344)
Nominal house price Real house price
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors), by region for 1991-2007. 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: SP's Case-Shiller index.
Table 7:D i ﬀerence in annualized percentage changes in house transactions between
semesters (second-third quarters vis-à-vis fourth-ﬁrst quarters) by US region.





United States 148.086*** (5.082)
Note: The Table shows the average differences (and standard errors) by 
region for 1991-2007. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. Source: National Association of Realtors.
Rents and Mortgage Rates As was the case for the UK, the paucity of rent data for the US
is regrettable. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides two series that can serve as proxies:
One is the NSA series of owner’s equivalent rent and the second is the NSA rent of primary residence;
both series are produced for the construction of the CPI and correspond to averages over all cities.
18For each series, we run regressions using as dependent variables both the rent levels and the log
of rents, de-trended in various ways, on a summer - t e r md u m m y . T h er e s u l t s( a v a i l a b l ef r o mt h e
authors) yielded no discernible pattern of seasonality. We take this as only suggestive as, of course,
the data are not as clean and detailed as we would wish. To reiterate, however, if seasonality in
rents were the driver of seasonality in prices, we should observe enormous seasonality in rental ﬂows
to generate the observed seasonality in house prices. In the model we present later, we will work
under the constraint that rents are aseasonal.
As ﬁrst documented by Barsky and Miron (1989), interest rates in recent decades do not exhibit
seasonality. We investigated in particular data on mortgage rates produced by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve, corresponding to contract interest rates on commitments for ﬁxed-rate
ﬁrst mortgages; the data are quarterly averages beginning in 1972; the original data are collected by
Freddie Mac. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Barsky and Miron (1989) and the evidence from the
UK, we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant deterministic seasonality. (Results available from the authors.)
2.3 Further Discussion
We have argued before that the predictability and size of the seasonal variation in house prices
pose a puzzle to models of the housing market relying on a standard asset-market approach. In
particular, the equilibrium condition embedded in most dynamic general-equilibrium models states
that the marginal beneﬁt of housing services should equal the marginal service cost. In Appendix
7.2 we assess the extent to which seasonality in service costs might be driving seasonality in prices,
given that rental ﬂows do not appear to be seasonal. The exercise makes clear that a standard
asset-pricing approach that relies on perfect arbitrage leads to implausibly large levels of required
seasonality in service costs.
Our ﬁndings suggest that there are important frictions in the market that impair the ability
of investors to gain from seasonal arbitrage and therefore call for a deviation from the standard
asset-pricing approach.16 But perhaps a more fundamental reason to deviate is the overwhelming
evidence that buying and selling houses involve a non-trivial search process that is not well captured
16The need to deviate from the asset-market approach has been acknowledged, in a diﬀerent context by Stein
(1995), among others. While static in nature, Stein’s model is capable of generating unexpected booms and busts in
prices (and transactions) in a rational-expectation setting. In a dynamic setting with forward-looking agents, however,
predictably large changes in prices cannot be sustained: Expected price increases in the next season will actually be
priced in in the current season. For other modelling frameworks, see Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2005) and Flavin and
Nakagawa (2008).
19in the standard asset-pricing approach. Furthermore, as is also the case in labor markets (and
largely the motivation for the labor-search literature) the coexistence at any point in time of a stock
of vacant houses and a pool of buyers searching for houses, suggests a lack of immediate market
clearing; explicitly modelling the frictions that impair clearing can help in the understanding of
housing market ﬂuctuations. We are of course not the ﬁrst to use a search-and-matching framework
to study housing markets; see for example early work by Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995), Krainer
(2001), and Albrecht et al. (2007). Our setup is diﬀerent from these earlier contributions in that
it brings in thick-market eﬀe c t s ,w h i c h ,d u et ot h e i ra m p l i ﬁc a t i o np o w e r ,a r ea b l et og e n e r a t el a r g e
ﬂuctuations in transactions and prices even in the absence of aggregate uncertainty.
3 A Search-and-Matching Model for the Housing Market
In this Section we develop a search-and-matching model for the housing market. The basic premise
in the model is that the suitability of a match between a house and a buyer is speciﬁct ot h ep a i r .
For example, a particular house may match a buyer’s needs or taste perfectly well, while at the same
time being an unsatisfactory match to another buyer. In that context, we introduce the notion that
in a market with more houses for sale, a buyer is more likely to ﬁnd a better match, what we refer
to as “thick-market eﬀect.”
3.1 The Economy
The economy is populated by a unit measure of inﬁnitely lived agents, who have linear preferences
over housing services and a non-durable consumption good. Each period agents receive a ﬁxed
endowment of the consumption good which they can either consume or use to buy housing services.
An agent can only enjoy housing services from living in one house at a time, that is, he can only
be “matched” to one house at a time. Agents who are not matched to a house seek to buy one
(“buyers”).
There is a unit measure of housing stock. Each period a house can be either matched or un-
matched. A matched house delivers a ﬂow of housing services of quality ε to its owner. The quality
of housing services ε is match-speciﬁc, and it reﬂects the suitability of a match between a house and
its homeowner. In other words, for any vacant house, the quality of housing services is idiosyncratic
to the match between the house and the potential buyer. Hence, ε is not the type of house (or of
the seller who owns a particular house). This is consistent with our data, which are adjusted for
20houses’ characteristics, such as size and location, but not for the quality of a match.17 Unmatched
houses are “for sale” and are owned by “sellers;” sellers receive a ﬂow u from any unmatched house
they own, where the ﬂow u is common to all sellers.
3.2 Seasons and Timing
There are two seasons, j = s,w (for summer and winter); each model period is a season, and seasons
alternate. At the beginning of a period j, an existing match between a homeowner and his house
breaks with probability 1−φ
j, and the house is put up for sale, adding to the stock of vacant houses
vj. The homeowner whose match has broken becomes simultaneously a seller and a buyer, adding
to the pool of buyers bj. In our baseline model, the parameter φ
j is the only (ex ante)d i ﬀerence
between the seasons.18 We focus on periodic steady states with constant vs and vw.S i n c eam a t c h
is between one house and one agent, and there is a unit measure of agents and a unit measure of
houses, it is always the case that the mass of vacant houses equals the mass of buyers: vj = bj.
Each period, each buyer meets with one seller and each seller meets with one buyer. If they
agree on a transaction, the buyer pays a price (discussed later) to the seller, and starts enjoying
the housing services ε. If not, the buyer looks for a house again next period, the seller receives the
ﬂow u, and puts the house up for sale again next period.19 An agent can hence be a homeowner, a
buyer, a seller, both a seller and a homeowner, and both a buyer and a seller. Also, sellers may have
multiple houses to sell.
3.3 Match-speciﬁcQ u a l i t y
The model seeks to embed the notion that in a market with many houses for sale, a buyer can see
more houses (e.g. by searching online or through newspapers) and hence is more likely to ﬁnd a
better match.20 We model this idea in the following way. Assume that the potential match quality,
17Neither repeat-sale indices nor hedonic price indexes can control for the quality of a match, which is not observed
by data collectors.
18This diﬀerence could be determined, for example, by the school calendar or summer marriages, among other
factors, exogenous to our model.
19In Section 5.2 we relax the assumption that if the transaction does not go through, buyer and seller need to wait
for next period to transact with other agents.
20Note that this is diﬀerent from the stock-ﬂow literature (see e.g. Coles and Smith, 1998), where the stock of old
buyers can only draw from the stock of new vacant houses. We do not draw a distinction here between old and new
buyers.
21ε, between a buyer and a house is drawn from a distribution F (ε,v), with positive support and ﬁnite
mean, where v denotes the stock of vacant houses.21 In that setting, our notion of a “thick-market”
is captured by the following assumption:
Assumption 1 F (.,v0) stochastically dominates F (.,v) if and only if v0 >v .
That is, F(.,v0) ≤ F (.,v) if and only if v0 >v . In words, when the stock of houses v is larger, a
random match-quality draw from F (ε,v) is likely to be higher.22,23
The assumption implies that a higher v shifts up the expected surplus of quality above any




(ε − x)dF (ε,v) is increasing in v. (1)
To see this, rewrite h(x,v)=
R
x [1 − F (ε,v)]dε using integration by parts, which is increasing in v
from Assumption 1.




1−F(ε,v) is increasing in ε for v0 >v .
This holds if the thick-market eﬀect is such that the increase in [1 − F (.,v)] due to higher v is
increasing in ε. Assumption 1 is of course implied by Assumption 2.T h eﬁrst is necessary for our
results, the second is only suﬃcient, as shall become clear later.
Using integration by parts, the conditional surplus can be expressed as:
E (ε − x | ε > x)=
R
x [1 − F (ε,v)]dε
1 − F (x,v)
,
which is increasing in v from Assumption 2.24
21The stochastic nature of the match-speciﬁc quality is closely related to the job matching model of Jovanovic
(1979).
22This is similar to Diamond (1981)’s labor market model, where he assumes that mobility costs are stochastically
lower when there are more ﬁrms and workers.
23One way to interpret our assumption is to think of order statistics. Suppose the buyer samples n units of vacant
houses when the stock of vacancies is v. As long as the number of units sampled n increases in v,t h em a x i m u m
match quality ε in the sample will be “stochastically larger.”
24Note that ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance does not guarantee that the conditional surplus is increasing in v,
a condition known as mean residual ordering (see Shaked and Shanthikumar, 1994). As shown by Shaked and
Shanthikumar (1994), Assumption 2 is a suﬃcient condition for this to hold. They also show that Assumption 2 is





1−F(.,v0) for v0 ≥ v,w h e r ef (ε,v) is the
corresponding probability density function.
223.4 The Homeowner
To study pricing and transaction decisions, we ﬁrst derive the value of living in a house if a transaction
goes through. The value function for a matched homeowner who lives in a house with match quality
ε in season s is given by:
H
s (ε)=ε + βφ
wH




where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. With probability (1 − φ
w) he receives a moving shock and
becomes both a buyer and a seller (putting his house up for sale), with continuation value (V w+Bw),
where V j is the value of a vacant house to its seller and Bj is the value of being a buyer in season
j = s,w,d e ﬁned later. With probability φ
w he keeps receiving housing services of quality ε and
stays in the house. The formula for Hw (ε) is perfectly isomorphic to Hs (ε); in the interest of space
we omit here and throughout the paper the corresponding expressions for season w.T h e v a l u e o f
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which is strictly increasing in ε.
3.5 Market Equilibrium
We focus on the case in which both seller and buyer observe the quality of the match, ε,t h a ti s
drawn from Fj (ε) ≡ F (ε,vj); we derive the results for the case in which the seller cannot observe
ε in Appendix 7.5. If the transaction goes through, the buyer pays a mutually agreed price to the
seller, and starts enjoying the housing services ﬂow in the same season j.I ft h et r a n s a c t i o nd o e sn o t
go through, the buyer receives zero housing services and looks for a house again next season. This
will be the case, for example, if buyers searching for a house pay a rent equal to the utility they
derive from the rented property; what is key is that the rental property is not owned by the same
potential seller with whom the buyer meets. On the seller’s side, when the transaction does not go
through, he receives the ﬂow u in season j and puts the house up for sale again next season. The
ﬂow u can be interpreted as a net rental income received by the seller. Again, what is key is that
the tenant is not the same potential buyer who visits the house.
Let Ss
v (ε) and Ss
b (ε) be the surplus of a transaction to the seller and to the buyer, respectively,
23in season s, when the match quality is ε and the price is ps (ε):
S
s
v (ε) ≡ p




b (ε) ≡ H
s (ε) − p
s (ε) − βB
w. (4)
Denote the total surplus by:
S





s (ε) − [β (B
w + V
w)+u] (5)
Since ε is observable and the surplus is transferrable, a transaction goes through as long as the total
surplus Ss (ε) is positive. Given Hs (ε) is increasing in ε, a transaction goes through if ε > εs,w h e r e







and 1−Fs (εs) is thus the probability that a transaction is carried out. Since the reservation quality
εs is related to the total surplus independently of how the surplus is divided between the buyer and
the seller, we postpone the discussion of equilibrium prices to Section 4.3.
3.5.1 Reservation Quality
Observe from (5) and (6) that
S
s (ε)=H








s (ε − ε
s), (7)
The value functions for being a seller and a buyer in season s are, respectively:
V
s = βV














b (ε) | ε > ε
s], (9)
where Es [.] indicates the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution Fs (.). A seller can
c o u n to nh i so u t s i d eo p t i o n ,βV w + u (the ﬂow u plus the option value of selling next season) and,
with probability [1 − Fs (εs)], on the expected surplus from a transaction for sellers. A buyer counts
on his outside option, βBw (the option value of buying next season), and, with the same probability,









s (ε) | ε > ε
s], (10)
24which is the sum of the housing value Hs (εs) of the marginal transaction and the expected surplus
from a transaction with quality ε, above the reservation εs. Using the deﬁnition of Ss (ε) and εs in
(5) and (6), and the expression in (7), the sum of values is:
B
s + V
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where hs (εs) ≡ h(εs,vs)=[ 1− Fs (εs)]E [ε − εs | ε > εs] is the expected surplus of quality above
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The equilibrium values εs,ε w,(Bs + V s), and (Bw + V w) in (12) and (13) depend on equilibrium
vacancies vs and vw, which we now derive.
3.5.2 Stock of vacant houses
In any season s, the law of motion for the stock of vacant houses (and for the stock of buyers) is
v
s =( 1− φ
s)[v
w (1 − F
w (ε





where the ﬁrst term includes houses that received a moving shock this season and the second term








The equilibrium quantities (Bs + V s,Bw + V w,ε s,ε w,v s,vw) jointly satisfy equations (12), (13),
and (14) together with the isomorphic equations for the other season. They are independent of
how the total surplus is shared across buyers and sellers, that is independent of the exact price-
setting mechanism. We ﬁrst discuss seasonality in vacancies and transactions before we specify the
particular price-setting mechanism.
4 Model-generated Seasonality
The driver for seasonality in the baseline model is the higher moving probability in the summer:
1 − φ
s > 1 − φ
w.
254.1 Seasonality in Vacancies







1 − Fs (εs)Fw (εw)φ
sφ
w . (15)
(The expression for vw is correspondingly isomorphic). The ex ante higher probability of moving in
the summer (1 − φ
s > 1 − φ
w) clearly has a direct positive eﬀect on vs,a n d ,a si tt u r n so u t ,t h i s
eﬀect also dominates quantitatively when we calibrate the model to match the average duration of
stay in a house.25 Thus, we have vs >v w.
4.2 Seasonality in Transactions
The number of transactions in equilibrium in season s is given by:
Q
s = v
s [1 − F
s (ε
s)]. (16)
(An isomorphic expression holds for Qw). Seasonality in transactions stems from three sources:
First, from (16), it is evident that a bigger stock of vacancies in the summer, vs >v w,h a sad i r e c t
positive eﬀect on the number of transactions in the summer relative to winter. Second, following
from Assumption 1, t h et h i c k - m a r k e te ﬀect shifts up the probability of a transaction for any given
reservation level x: [1 − Fs (x)] > [1 − Fw (x)], which again positively aﬀects Qs/Qw. Finally, there
is an equilibrium eﬀect through a higher reservation quality in the winter: εw >ε s,w h i c ha l s o
leads to lower transactions in the winter.26 This equilibrium eﬀect turns out to be quantitatively
small in our calibrations, as the equilibrium cutoﬀs are very close in the two seasons. The bulk of
25More speciﬁcally, the numerator is a weighted average of 1 and Fw (εw)(1− φ
w), with 1 − φ
s being the weight
assigned to 1.S i n c e Fw (εw)(1− φ
w) < 1,h i g h e rw e i g h to n1, that is, higher weight (1 − φ
s) leads to vs >v w;
this is because Fw (εw)(1− φ
w) is virtually aseasonal as there are two opposite eﬀects: Fw (εw) >F s (εs) and
(1 − φ
w) < (1 − φ
s) that tend to largely cancel each other.
26 The outside option for both buyers and sellers in the winter is to wait and transact in the summer, (Bs + V s),
when their expected returns are higher than in the winter, (Bw + V w). This makes both buyers and sellers more
demanding in the winter and hence less likely to transact, yielding an even smaller number of transactions. To see
this more explicitly, note ﬁr s tt h a tg i v e nvs >v w, the thick-market eﬀect implies hs (εs) >h w (εw) as in (1). It then
follows from (12) that (Bs + V s) > (Bw + V w). Because the cutoﬀsa r ed e ﬁned by Hs (εs)=β (Bw + V w)+u, then
εw >ε s.T h a t i s ,t h e marginal transaction in the winter has a higher match quality given that the outside option
of buyers and sellers (to transact in the summer) is higher. Note, though, that because of the thick-market eﬀect,
the average transaction in the summer is of higher match quality. As u decreases, the outside option of buyers and
sellers decreases and so does the extent of seasonality due to this channel.
26the ampliﬁcation mechanism in the model is due to the second source, the thick-market eﬀect: For
a given level of seasonality in vacancies, the thick-market eﬀect through the ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance of Fs (.) over Fw (.) can generate higher seasonality in transactions. Our ﬁrst result
follows:
Ampliﬁcation: Transactions are more seasonal than vacancies.
4.3 Seasonality in Prices
As discussed earlier, results on seasonality in vacancies and transactions are independent of the
exact price-setting mechanism. We now consider the case in which prices are determined by Nash













b (ε) > 0;









which simpliﬁes to (see Appendix 7.3):
p
s (ε)=θH




a weighted average of the housing value for the matched homeowner and the present discounted value
of the ﬂow u. In other words, the price guarantees the seller the proceeds from the alternative usage
of the house ( u
1−β)a n daf r a c t i o nθ of the social surplus generated by the transaction
h




The average price of a transaction is:
P
s ≡ E [p





s (ε) | ε > ε
s], (19)
which is increasing in the conditional expected surplus of housing services for transactions exceeding
the reservation εs.S i n c e u is aseasonal, house prices are seasonal if θ>0 and the surplus to the
seller is seasonal (as we show). The next result follows:
Seasonality in Prices W h e ns e l l e r sh a v es o m eb a r g a i n i n gp o w e r(θ>0), prices are seasonal. The
extent of seasonality is increasing in θ.
27To see this, note ﬁrst that from (19) the equilibrium price Ps is the discounted sum of the ﬂow
value ( u
1−β) plus a fraction θ of the surplus from the sale, Es
h³
Hs (ε) − u
1−β
´
| ε > εs
i
.B e c a u s e u
1−β
is constant in the two seasons, the surplus is higher in the summer than in the winter if the average
housing value is higher: Es [Hs (ε) | ε > εs] >E s [Hw (ε) | ε > εw]. Recall from (7) that the average
housing value of transacted houses is the sum of two terms:
E
s [H










s [ε − ε
s | ε > ε
s]. (20)
The ﬁrst term, Hj (εj), the housing value of the marginal transaction, tends to reduce the average
housing value in the summer, since the cutoﬀ is lower: εw >ε s. Quantitatively, however, the
diﬀerence in equilibrium cutoﬀs across the two seasons turns out to be very small for reasonable
parametrizations of the model. The second term, instead, tends to increase the average housing
value in the summer for two reasons. First, the probability of stay is higher in the winter, φ
w >
φ
s. Second, and more important, following from Assumption 2, the expected conditional surplus
Es [ε − x | ε > x] is higher in the summer for any given cutoﬀ x; because, as said, the equilibrium
cutoﬀs are quantitatively close, Assumption 2 will in general lead to:
E
s [ε | ε > ε
s] − ε
s >E
w [ε | ε > ε
w] − ε
w (21)
More precisely, as shown by Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994), the expected conditional surplus over
ac u t o ﬀ x decreases with the cutoﬀ if the distribution F(.) is log-concave, that is, E [ε − x | ε > x]
decreases in x. Thus, it follows from Assumption 2 that condition (21) holds.
Given that θ aﬀects Ps only through the equilibrium mass of vacancies (recall the reservation
quality εs is independent of θ), it follows that the extent of seasonality in prices is increasing in θ.
Since (19) holds independently of the steady state equation for vs and vw, this result is independent
of what drives vs >v w. Note ﬁnally, that the extent of seasonality in prices is decreasing in the size
of the (aseasonal) ﬂow u.
4.4 Quantitative Results
4.4.1 Parameter values
We now calibrate the model to study its quantitative implications. We assume the distribution of
match-quality F (ε,v) follows a uniform distribution on [0,v]. When vs >v w (which will follow
from φ
w >φ
s), this implies both ﬁrst-order stochastic ordering, Fs (.) 6 Fw (.), and mean residual
ordering, Es [ε − x | ε > x] > Ew [ε − x | ε > x].
28We set the discount factor β so that the implied annual real interest rate is 6 percent.
We calibrate the average probability of staying in the house, φ =( φ
s + φ
w)/2, to match survey
data on the average duration of stay in a given house, which in the model is given by 1
1−φ.T h e
median duration in the US from 1993 through 2005, according to the American Housing Survey,
was 18 semesters; the median duration in the UK during this period, according to the Survey of
English Housing was 26 semesters. The implied (average) moving probabilities (1−φ) per semester
are hence 0.056 and 0.038 for the US and the UK, respectively. Because there is no direct data
on the ex-ante ratio of moving probabilities between seasons, (1 − φ
s)/(1 − φ
w),w eu s ear a n g e
of (1 − φ
s)/(1 − φ
w) from 1.1 to 1.5.27 This implies a diﬀerence in staying probabilities between
seasons, φ
w − φ
s, ranging from 0.004 to 0.015 in the UK and 0.005 to 0.022 i nt h eU S .O n ew a yt o
p i nd o w nt h el e v e lo f(1 − φ
s)/(1 − φ
w) is to use data on vacancy seasonality, which is available for
the US from the US Census Bureau (for the UK, data on vacancies only exist at yearly frequency).
Seasonality in vacancies in the US was 31 percent during 1991 − 2007.28 As will become clear
from the results displayed below, the ratio that exactly matches seasonality in US vacancies is
(1 − φ
s)/(1 − φ
w)=1 .28. The reader may want to view this as a deep parameter and potentially
u s ei ta l s of o rt h eU K ,u n d e rt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tt h ee x t e n to fs e a s o n a l i t yi ne x - a n t em o v i n g
probabilities does not vary across countries.
We calibrate the ﬂow value u to match the implied average rent-to-price ratio received by the
seller. In the UK, the average gross rent-to-price ratio is roughly around 5 percent per year, according
to Global Property Guide.29 For the US, Davis et al. (2008) argue that the ratio was around 5 percent
prior to 1995 when it started falling, reaching 3.5 percent by 2005. In our model, the u/P ratio
(where P stands for the average price, absent seasonality) corresponds to the net rental ﬂow received
by the seller after paying taxes and other relevant costs; it is accordingly lower than the gross rent-
27The two surveys mentioned also report the main reasons for moving. Around 30 percent of the respondents report
that living closer to work or to their children’s school and getting married are the main reasons for moving. These
factors are of course not entirely exogenous, but they can carry a considerably exogenous component; in particular,
the school calendar is certainly exogenous to housing market movements (see Goodman, 1993, and Tucker, Long,
and Marx , 1995 on seasonal mobility). In all, the survey evidence supports our working hypothesis that the ex ante
probability to move is higher in the summer (or, equivalently the probability to stay is higher in the winter).
28As a measure of seasonality we use, as before, the diﬀerence in annualized growth rates in vacancies between
broadly deﬁned summers and winters. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels. Vacancy is com-
puted as the sum of houses for sale at the beginning of the season relative to the stock of houses.
29Data for the U.K. and other European countries can be found in
http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/United-Kingdom/price-rent-ratio
29to-price ratio. As a benchmark, we choose u so that the net rent-to-price ratio is equal to 3 percent
per year (or 1.5 percent per semester), equivalent to assuming a 40 percent income tax on rent).30
To obtain a calibrated model of u,w h i c h ,a sw es a i d ,i sa s e a s o n a li n the data, we use the equilibrium
equations in the model without seasonality, that is, the model in which φ
s = φ
w = φ.F r o m( 1 9 )a n d
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1 − βφF (εd)
. (23)
We hence substitute u =0 .015·P in the aseasonal model (equivalent to an annual rent-to-price ratio
of 3 percent) for θ =1 /2 (when sellers and buyers have the same bargaining power) and ﬁnd the
equilibrium value of P g i v e nt h ec a l i b r a t e dv a l u e sf o rβ and F (.). We then use the implied value of
u =0 .015 · P as a parameter.31
Finally, in reporting the results for prices, we vary θ, the seller’s bargaining power parameter
from 0 to 1.
4.4.2 Model-Generated Seasonality
Given the calibrated values of u, β,a n dφ discussed above, Table 8 displays the extent of seasonality
in vacancies and transactions generated by the model for diﬀerent values of the ratio of moving
probabilities (recall that seasonality in vacancies and transactions is independent of the bargaining
power of the seller, θ). As throughout the paper, our metric for seasonality is the annualized diﬀer-
ence in growth rates between the two seasons. Column (1) shows the ratio of moving probabilities,
1−φs
1−φw. Columns (2) and (5) show the implied diﬀerence in moving probabilities between the two
seasons for the US and the UK, [(1 − φ
s) − (1 − φ
w)]. (Recall that, because the average stay in
ah o u s ed i ﬀers across the two countries, a given ratio can imply diﬀerent values for φ
w − φ
s,a s
the average probability of stay φ diﬀers.) Columns (3) and (4) show the extent of seasonality in
30In principle, other costs can trim down the 3-percent u/P ratio, including maintenance costs, and ineﬃciencies
in the rental market that lead to a higher wedge between what the tenant pays and what the landlord receives; also,
it might not be possible to rent the house immediately, leading to lower average ﬂows u. Note that lower values of
u/p lead to even higher seasonality in prices and transactions for any given level of seasonality in moving shocks.
31We also calibrated the model using diﬀerent values of u for diﬀerent θ (instead of setting θ =1 /2), keeping the
ratio u/P constant. Results are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent under this procedure, but the comparability of results for
diﬀerent values of θ becomes less clear, since u is not kept ﬁxed.
30vacancies and transactions for an average stay of 9 years (as in the US) and Columns (6) and (7)
show the corresponding ﬁgures for an average stay of 13 years (as in the UK)





















1.10 0.005 12% 49% 0.004 11% 48%
1.20 0.010 23% 94% 0.007 21% 93%
1.30 0.014 33% 136% 0.010 30% 133%
1.40 0.019 42% 174% 0.013 38% 171%
1.50 0.022 51% 211% 0.015 45% 207%
Average moving probability:  0.0385      
Stay of 13 years (U.K.)
Average moving probability:  0.0556      





seasons     
(1)
The ﬁrst point to note is the large ampliﬁcation mechanism present in the model: For any given
level of seasonality in vacancies, seasonality in transactions is at least four times bigger. Second, the
Table shows that a small absolute diﬀerences in the probability to stay between the two seasons can
induce large seasonality in vacancies and transactions. Third, if we constrain ourselves to
1−φs
1−φw =1 .28
to match the data on vacancies for the US, this implies a level of seasonality in transactions of about
135 percent in the US, very close to the actual 148 percent observed in the data. For the UK, ideally
we would like to recalibrate the ratio
1−φs
1−φw to match its seasonality in vacancies; however, as said,
the data are only available at yearly frequency. Using the same ratio
1−φs
1−φw =1 .28 as a parameter for
the UK would yield a seasonality in vacancies of 29 percent (the diﬀerence with the US is due to the
longer duration of stay in the UK). This in turn would imply a degree of seasonality in transactions
of 131 percent, somewhat above the 108 percent in the data. Note that, for a given ratio
1−φs
1−φw,t h e
model generates more seasonality in transactions in the US than in the UK (as in the data) because
a given ratio implies a higher diﬀerence in moving probabilities [(1 − φ
s) − (1 − φ
w)] in the US than
in the UK, as the average stay is shorter in the former.
Seasonality in prices, as expressed earlier, depends crucially on the bargaining power of the seller,
θ.F i g u r e 8 plots the model-generated seasonality in prices for diﬀerent θ and
1−φs
1−φw, assuming an
average stay of 13 y e a r s( a si nt h eU K ) ,a n dF i g u r e9 shows the corresponding plot for an average





1−φw =1 .28 as given, the exercise implies that to match real-price seasonality in the
UK (of about 6 percent, averaging between DCLG and Halifax), the bargaining power coeﬃcient
31θ needs to be around 75 percent. The corresponding value for the US as a whole, with real-price
seasonality just above 3 percent, is 25 percent. For US cities, as noted in Table 6, seasonality is
comparable to that in the UK (with an average of 5.7 percent for real prices, using the Case-Shiller
composite of cities); the model accordingly suggests that in US cities the bargaining power of sellers
is considerably higher than in the economy as a whole.
T h eq u e s t i o ni so fc o u r s ew h e t h e rl a r g ed i ﬀerences in the bargaining power of sellers across the
two countries as a whole (and between US cities and the rest of the US) are tenable. There are at
least two reasons why we think this is a reasonable characterization. First, population density in
the UK (246 inhabitants per km2)i s700 percent higher than in the US (31 inhabitants per km2),
making land signiﬁcantly scarcer relative to population in the UK, and potentially conferring home
owners more power in price negotiations (this should also be true in denser US cities). Second,
anecdotal evidence suggests that land use regulations are particularly stringent in the UK.32 Indeed
in its international comparison of housing markets, the OECD Economic Outlook 2005 highlights
the “complex and ineﬃcient local zoning regulations and slow authorization process” in the UK
economy, which the report cites as one of the reasons for the remarkable rigidity of housing supply.33
Restrictions reinforce the market power of owners by reducing the supply of houses.
Figure 8: Seasonality in prices for diﬀerent θ and
1−φs
1−φw.U K .





























































32Again, this is likely to be true also in major cities in the US.
33OECD Economic Outlook 2005, Number 78, chapter III, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/56/35756053.pdf
32Figure 9. Seasonality in prices for diﬀerent θ and
1−φs
1−φw.U S .





























































5R e m a r k s o n t h e M o d e l
5.1 Eﬃciency Properties of the model
This Section discusses the eﬃciency of equilibrium in the decentralized economy. For a complete
derivation, see Appendix 7.4. The planner observes the match quality ε and is subject to the
same exogenous moving shocks that hit the decentralized economy. The key diﬀerence between the
planner’s solution and the decentralized solution is that the former internalizes the thick-market
eﬀect. It is evident that the equilibrium level of transactions in the decentralized economy is not
socially eﬃcient because the optimal decision rules of buyers and sellers takes the stock of vacancies
in each period as given, thereby ignoring the eﬀects of their decisions on the stock of vacant houses
in the following periods. The thick-market eﬀect generates a negative externality that makes the
number of transactions in the decentralized economy ineﬃciently high for any given stock of vacant
houses (transacting agents do not take into account that, by waiting, they can thicken the market
in the following period and hence increase the overall quality of matches).34
The eﬃcient level of seasonality in housing markets, however, will depend on the exact distri-
bution of match quality F(ε,v). Under likely scenarios, the solution of the planner will involve
34This result is similar to that in the stochastic job matching model of Pissarides (2000, chapter 8), where the
reservation productivity is too low compared to the eﬃcient outcome in the presence of search externalities.
33a positive level of seasonality; that is, seasonality can be an eﬃcient outcome. Indeed, in some
circumstances, a planner may be willing to completely shut down the market in the cold season,
to fully seize the beneﬁts of a thick market.35 This outcome is not as unlikely as one may a priori
think. For example, the academic market for junior economists is extremely seasonal.36 Extreme
seasonality of course relies on the speciﬁcation of utility–here we simply assume linear preferences;
if agents have suﬃciently concave utility functions (and intertemporal substitution across seasons is
extremely low), then the planner may want to smooth seasonal ﬂuctuations. For housing services,
however, the concern of smoothing consumption across two seasons in principle should not be too
strong relative to the beneﬁt of having a better match that is on average long lasting (9 to 13 years
in the two countries we analyze).
5.2 Model Assumptions
It is of interest to discuss three assumptions in the model. First, we assume that each buyer only
meets one seller and each seller meets only one buyer in a given season. We do this for simplicity so
that we can focus on the comparison across seasons. One might worry that if the outside option for
a buyer is to meet another seller (rather than just renting and searching next period), that might
aﬀect the results on price seasonality.37 This is, however, not the case here. Note ﬁr s tt h a tt h e
seller’s outside option is also to sell to another buyer. More formally, the surplus to the buyer if the
transaction for her ﬁrst house goes through is:
˜ S
s
b (ε) ≡ H
s (ε) − ˜ p
s (ε) − {E
s [S
s
b (η)] + βB
w}, (24)
where Es [Ss
b (η)] is the equilibrium expected surplus (as deﬁn e di n( 4 ) )f o rt h eb u y e ri fs h eg o e sf o r
another house with random quality η. By deﬁnition Ss
b (η) > 0 (it equals zero when the draw for the
second house η is too low). Compared to (4), the outside option for the buyer is higher because of




v (ε) ≡ ˜ p
s (ε) − {βV




35The same will happen in the decentralized economy when the ratio (1 − φ
s)/(1 − φ
w) is extremely high, e.g. the
required ratio is larger than 10 for the calibrated parametrs we use.
36And it is perhaps highly eﬃcient, given that it has been designed by our well-trained senior economists.
37Concretely, one might argue that the seller of the best house can now only capture part of the surplus of the
buyer in excess of the buyer’s second-best house. In this case, for the surplus (and hence prices) to be higher in the
summer one would need higher dispersion of match quality in the summer. This intuition is, however, incomplete.
Indeed, one can show that higher prices are obtained independently of the level of dispersion.
34The key is that both buyer and seller take their outside options as given when bargaining.
The price ˜ ps (ε) maximizes the Nash product with the surplus terms ˜ Ss
b (ε) and ˜ Ss
v (ε). The solu-
tion implies (1 − θ) ˜ Ss
v (ε)=θ˜ Ss
b (ε), but the Nash bargaining for the second house implies that
(1 − θ)Es [Ss
v (η)] = θEs [Ss
b (η)], so:
(1 − θ)[˜ p
s (ε) − (βV
w + u)] = θ[H
s (ε) − ˜ p
s (ε) − βB
w],
which has the same form as (17); thus it follows that the equilibrium price equation for ˜ ps (ε) is
identical to (18)–though the actual level of prices is diﬀerent, as the cutoﬀ match-quality is diﬀerent.
Our qualitative results on seasonality in prices continue to hold as before, and quantitatively they
can be even stronger. Recall that in the baseline model we ﬁnd that seasonality in the sum of buyer’s
and seller’s values tends to reduce the quality of marginal transactions in the summer relative to
winter because the outside option in the hot season is linked to the sum of values in the winter
season: Bw + V w. Intuitively, allowing the possibility of meeting another party in the same season
as an outside option could mitigate this eﬀect and hence strengthen seasonality in prices. To see this,
the cutoﬀ quality ˜ εs is now deﬁned by: Hs (˜ εs)=β (Bw + V w)+u + Es [Ss (η)]. Compared to (6),
the option of meeting another party as outside option shows up as an additional term, Es [Ss (η)],
w h i c hi sh i g h e ri nt h eh o ts e a s o n .
As e c o n ds i m p l i ﬁcation in the model is that buying and selling houses involve no transaction costs.
This assumption is easy to dispense with. Let ¯ τ
j
b and ¯ τj
v be the transaction costs associated with
the purchase (¯ τ
j
b)a n ds a l e( ¯ τj
v) of a house in season j. Costs can be seasonal because moving costs
and repairing costs may vary across seasons.38 The previous deﬁnitions of surpluses are modiﬁed by
replacing price pj with pj − ¯ τj
v in (3) and with pj +¯ τ
j
b in (4). The value functions (9) and (8), and
the Nash solution (17) continue to hold as before. So, the price equation becomes:
p
s (ε) − ¯ τ
s
v = θ[H
s (ε) − ¯ τ
s






which states that the net price received by a seller is a weighted average of housing value net of total
















38Repair costs (both for the seller who’s trying to make the house more attractive and for the buyer who wants to
adapt it before moving in) may be smaller in the summer because good weather and the opportunity cost of time
(assuming vacation is taken in the summer) are important inputs in construction). Moving costs, similarly, might be
lower during vacation (because of both job and school holidays).
35The extent of seasonality in transactions depends only on total costs (¯ τ
j
b+¯ τj
v)w h i l et h ee x t e n to f
seasonality in prices depends on the distribution of costs between buyers and sellers. One interesting
result is that higher winter costs do not always result in lower winter prices. Indeed, if most of the
transaction costs fall on the seller (¯ τj
v is high relative to ¯ τ
j
b), prices could actually be higher in the
winter for θ suﬃciently high. On the other hand, if most of the transaction costs are bared by the
buyer, then seasonal transaction costs could potentially be the driver of seasonality in vacancies
(and hence transactions and prices). As said, our theoretical results on seasonality in prices and
transactions follow from vs >v w, independently of the particular trigger (that is, independently of
whether it is seasonal transaction costs for the buyer or seasonal moving shocks; empirically, they
are observationally equivalent, as they both lead to seasonality in vacancies, which we match in the
quantitative exercise39).
Finally, the model presented so far assumed observable match-quality. In Appendix 7.5 we derive
the case in which the seller cannot observe the match quality ε.W em o d e lt h es e l l e r ’ sp o w e rθ in this
case as the probability that the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer; 1 − θ is then the probability
that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer upon meeting.40 In that setting, θ =1corresponds
to the case in which sellers always post prices. When ε is observable, a transaction goes through
whenever the total surplus is positive. However, when the seller does not observe ε, a transaction
goes through only when the surplus to the buyer is positive. Since the seller does not observe ε, the
seller oﬀe r sap r i c et h a ti si n d e p e n d e n to ft h el e v e lo fε, which will be too high for some buyers whose
ε0s are not suﬃciently high (but whose ε would have resulted in a transaction if ε were observable
to the seller). Therefore, because of the asymmetric information, the match is privately eﬃcient
only when the buyer is making a price oﬀer. We show that our results continue to hold; the only
qualitative diﬀerence is that the extent of seasonality in transactions is now decreasing in θ.T h i s
is because when ε is unobservable there is a second channel aﬀecting a seller’s surplus and hence
the seasonality of reservation quality, which is opposite to the eﬀects from the seasonality of outside
option described above: When the seller is making a price oﬀer, the surplus of the seller is higher
in the hot season and hence sellers are more demanding and less willing to transact, which reduces
the seasonality of transactions; the higher the seller’s power, θ, t h em o r ed e m a n d i n gt h e ya r ea n d
39Furthermore, empirically, we are unaware of data on direct measures of moving costs or propensities to move,
much less so at higher frequency.
40Samuelson (1984) shows that in bargaining between informed and uninformed agents, the optimal mechanism is
for the uninformed agent to make a “take-it-or-leave” oﬀer. The same holds for the informed agent if it is optimal for
him to make an oﬀer at all.
36the lower is the seasonality in transaction.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper documents seasonal booms and busts in housing markets and argues that the predictabil-
ity and high extent of seasonality in house prices cannot be quantitatively reconciled with models
taking a simple asset-pricing approach.
To explain the empirical patterns, the paper presents a search-and-matching model that can
quantitatively account for the seasonal ﬂuctuations in prices and transactions observed in the US
and the UK. The model sheds new light on interesting mechanisms governing ﬂuctuations in housing
markets that are likely to be present at lower frequencies. In particular, the thick-market eﬀect that
is at the core of the model’s propagation mechanism does not depend on the frequency of the shocks.
Lower frequency shocks associated with either business-cycle shocks or with less frequent booms and
busts in housing markets could also be propagated through the same thick-market eﬀects, to produce
more amplitude in the ﬂuctuations.
377 Appendix
7.1 Aggregate Seasonality (as Reported by the Publishers)
A ﬁrst indication that house prices display seasonality comes from the observation that most pub-
lishers of house price indexes directly report SA data. Some publishers, however, report both SA
and NSA data, and from these sources one can obtain a ﬁrst measure of seasonality, as gauged by
the publishers. For example, in the UK, Halifax publishes both NSA and SA house price series.
Using these two series we computed the (logged) seasonal component of house prices as the ratio
of the NSA house price series, Pt, relative to the SA series, P∗







This seasonal component is plotted in Figure A.1. (Both the NSA and the SA series correspond to
t h eU Ka saw h o l e . )
In the US, both the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)’s house price
index and the Case-Shiller index carried out by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) are published in NSA
and SA form. Figure A.2 depicts the seasonal component of the OFHEO series for the US as a






, from 1991:01 through to 2007:04. And Figure A.3 shows
the corresponding plot for the Case-Shiller index corresponding to a composite of 10 cities, with the
data running from 1987:01 through to 2007:04. (The start of the sample in all cases is dictated by
data availability.)41
All Figures seem to show a consistent pattern: House prices in the second and third quarters
tend to rise above trend (captured by the SA series), and prices in the fourth, and particularly in
the ﬁr s tq u a r t e r ,t e n dt ob ei ng e n e r a la to rb e l o wt r e n d . T h eF i g u r e sa l s om a k ei te v i d e n tt h a t
the extent of price seasonality is more pronounced in the UK than in the US as a whole, though as
shown in the text, certain cities in the US seem to display seasonal patterns of the same magnitude
as those observed in the UK. (Some readers might be puzzled by the lack of symmetry in Figure A.2,
as most expect the seasons to cancel out; this is exclusively due to the way OFHEO performs the
seasonal adjustment;42 for the sake of clarity and comparability across diﬀerent datasets, we base
our analysis only on the “raw”, NSA series and hence the particular choice of seasonal adjustment
by the publishers is inconsequential.)
41The original data in S&P’s are monthly; we hence take the last month of the quarter–results are virtually
identical when taking the average over the quarter.
42OFHEO uses the Census Bureau’s X-12 ARIMA procedure for SA; it is not clear, however, what the exact
seasonality structure chosen is.



















































































































. Pt is the NSA and P∗
t the SA index. Source: Halifax.
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; Pt is the NSA and P∗
t the SA index. Source: OFHEO.
39Figure A.3: Seasonal Component of House Prices in US cities 1987-2007.
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. Pt is the NSA and P∗
t the SA index. Source: Case-Shiller 10-city composite.
Last, but not least, the US National Association of Realtors (NAR) publishes data on transactions
both with and without SA. Figure A.4 plots the seasonal component of house transactions, measured










Figure A.4: Seasonal Component of Housing Transactions in the US. 1989-2007.
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; Qt is the NSA and Q∗
t the SA number of transactions. Source: NAR.
40The seasonal pattern for transactions is similar to that for prices: Transactions surge in the
second and third quarters and stagnate or fall in the fourth and ﬁrst quarters. (In the UK only NSA
data for transactions are available from the publishers.)
7.2 A back-of-the-envelope calculation
We argued before that the predictability and size of the seasonal variation in housing prices pose a
puzzle to models of the housing market relying on standard asset-market equilibrium conditions. In
particular, the equilibrium condition embedded in most dynamic general-equilibrium models states
that the marginal beneﬁt of housing services should equal the marginal cost. Following Poterba
(1984) the asset-market equilibrium conditions for any seasons j = s (summer),w( w i n t e r )a tt i m e
t is:43
dt+1,j0 +( pt+1,j0 − pt,j)=ct,j · pt,j (28)
where j0 is the corresponding season at time t +1 ,p t,j and dt,j are the real asset price and rental
price of housing services, respectively; ct,j ·pt,j is the real gross (gross of capital gains) t−period cost
of housing services of a house with real price pt,j;a n dct,j is the sum of after-tax depreciation, repair
costs, property taxes, mortgage interest payments, and the opportunity cost of housing equity.
Note that the formula assumes away risk (and hence no expectation terms are included); this is
appropriate in this context because we are focusing on a “predictable” variation of prices.44 As in
Poterba (1984), we make the following simplifying assumptions so that service-cost rates are a ﬁxed
proportion of the property price, though still potentially diﬀerent across seasons (ct,j = ct+2,j = cj,
j = s,w): 1) Depreciation takes place at rate δj,j= s,w, constant for a given season, and the house
requires maintenance and repair expenditures equal to a fraction κj, j = s,w, also constant for a
given season. 2) The income-tax-adjusted real interest rate and the marginal property tax rates (for
given real property prices) are constant over time, though also potentially diﬀerent across seasons;
they are denoted, respectively as rj and τj, j = s,w (in the data, as seen, they are actually constant
across seasons; we come back to this point below).45 This yields cj = δj +κj +rj +τj,f o rj = s,w.
43See also Mankiw and Weil (1989) and Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), among others.
44Note that Poterba’s formula also implicitly assumes linear preferences and hence perfect intertemporal substitu-
tion. This is a good assumption in the context of seasonality, given that substitution across semesters (or relatively
short periods of time) should in principle be quite high.
45We implicitly assume the property-price brackets for given marginal rates are adjusted by inﬂation rate, though
strictly this is not the case (Poterba, 1984): inﬂation can eﬀectively reduce the cost of homeownership. This, however,
should not alter the conclusions concerning seasonal patterns emphasized here. As in Poterba (1984) we also assume
41Subtracting (28) from the corresponding expression in the following season and using the condi-





















1.0106. The value of cs can be pinned-down from equation (28) with j = s,
depending on the actual rent-to-price ratios in the economy. In Table A.1,w es u m m a r i z et h ee x t e n t
of seasonality in service costs cw
cs implied by the asset-market equilibrium conditions, for diﬀerent





Table A.1: Ratio of Winter-To-Summer Cost Rates














As the Table illustrates, a remarkable amount of seasonality in service costs is needed to explain
the diﬀerences in housing price inﬂation across seasons. Speciﬁcally, assuming annualized rent-to-
price ratios in the range of 2 through 5 percent, total costs in the winter should be between 334 and
218 percent of those in the summer. Depreciation and repair costs (δj+κj) might be seasonal, being
potentially lower during the summer.47 But income-tax-adjusted interest rates and property taxes
(rj+τj), two major components of service costs are not seasonal. Since depreciation and repair costs
are only part of the total costs, given the seasonality in other components, the implied seasonality in
depreciation and repair costs across seasons in the UK is even larger. Assuming, quite conservatively,
that the a-seasonal component (rj +τj = r +τ) accounts for only 50 percent of the service costs in
the summer (r + τ =0 .5cs), then, the formula for relative costs cw
cs = δw+κw+0.5cs
δs+κs+0.5cs implies that the
that the opportunity cost of funds equals the cost of borrowing.
46In the empirical Section we computed growth rates using diﬀerence in logs; the numbers are very close using
pt+1,j0−pt,j
pt,j instead. We use annualized rates as in the text; using semester rates of course leads to the same results.
47Good weather can help with external repairs and owners’ vacation might reduce the opportunity cost of time–
though for this to be true it would be key that leisure were not too valuable for the owners.
42ratio of depreciation and repair costs between summers and winters is δw+κw
δs+κs =2 cw
cs −1.48 For rent-
to-price ratios in the range of 2 through 5 percent, depreciation and maintenance costs in the winter
should be between 568 and 336 percent of those in the summer. (If the a-seasonal component (r+τ)
accounts for 80 percent of the service costs (r + τ =0 .8cs), the corresponding values are 1571 and
989 percent). By any metric, these ﬁgures seem extremely large and suggest that a deviation from
the simple asset-pricing equation is called for. Similar calculations can be performed for diﬀerent
regions in the US; as expressed before, though the extent of price seasonality for the US as a whole
is lower than in the UK, seasonality in several US cities is comparable to that in the UK and would
therefore also imply large seasonality in service costs, according to condition (28).
7.3 Derivation for the model with observable value
7.3.1 Solving for prices
To derive ps (ε) in (18), use the Nash solution (17),
[p
s (ε) − βV
w − u](1− θ)=[ H
s (ε) − p





s (ε)+β [(1 − θ)V
w − θB
w]+( 1− θ)u. (30)
Using the value functions (8) and (9),
(1 − θ)V
s − θB









substitute into (30) to obtain (18).
7.3.2 The model without seasons
The value functions for the model without seasons are identical to those in the model with seasonality
without the superscripts s and w. It can be shown that the equilibrium equations are also identical
48Call λ the aseasonal component as a fraction of the summer service cost rate: r + τ = λcs, λ ∈ (0,1) (and hence
δs + κs =( 1− λ)cs). Then: cw
cs = δw+κw+λcs
δs+κs+λcs = δw+κw+λcs






1−λ, which is increasing in λ for cw
cs > 1.
43by simply setting φ
s = φ






























(1 − β)(V + B)
and B + V from (12),










E [˜ ε − ε | ˜ ε > ε]+β
1 − F
1 − βφ
E [˜ ε − ε | ˜ ε > ε]
¾
which reduces to:




1 − F (ε)
(1 − β)(1− βφ)
E (˜ ε − ε | ˜ ε > ε).
It follows that
ε = u +
βφ
1 − βφ
[1 − F (ε)]E (˜ ε − ε | ˜ ε > ε),
and the law of motion for vacancy implies:
v =
1 − φ
1 − φF (ε)
.
7.4 Analytical derivations of the planner’s solution
The planner observes the match quality ε and is subject to the same exogenous moving shocks that
hit the decentralized economy. The interesting comparison is the level of reservation quality achieved
by the planner with the corresponding level in the decentralized economy. To spell out the planner’s
problem, we follow Pissarides (2000) and assume that in any period t the planner takes as given
the expected value of the housing utility service per person in period t (before he optimizes), which
we denote by qt−1, as well as the beginning of period’s stock of vacant houses, vt. Thus, taking as
given the initial levels q−1 and v0, and the sequence {φt}t=0..., which alternates between φ
j and φ
j0
for seasons j,j0 = s,w, the planner’s problem is to choose a sequence of {εt}t=0,.. to maximize




t [qt + uvtF (εt;vt)] (32)
subject to the law of motion for qt :




44the law of motion for vt (which is similar to the one in the decentralized economy):
vt+1 = vtφt+1F (εt;vt)+1− φt+1,( 3 4 )
and the inequality constraint:
0 6 εt 6 ¯ ε(vt), (35)
where the upper bound ¯ ε can potentially be inﬁnite.
The planner faces two types of trade-oﬀs when deciding the optimal reservation quality εt:A
static one and a dynamic one. The static trade-oﬀ stems from the comparison of utility values
generated by occupied houses and vacant houses in period t in the objective function (32). The utility
per person generated from vacant houses is the rental income per person, captured by uvtF (εt).
The utility generated by occupied houses in period t is captured by qt, the expected housing utility
service per person conditional on the reservation value εt set by the planner in period t. The utility qt,
which follows the law of motion (33), is the sum of the pre-existing expected housing utility qt−1 that
survives the moving shock and the expected housing utility from the new matches. By increasing
εt, the expected housing value qt decreases, while the utility generated by vacant houses increases
(since F (εt) increases). The dynamic trade-oﬀ operates through the law of motion for the stock
of vacant houses in (34). By increasing εt (which in turn decreases qt), the number of transactions
in the current period decreases; this leads to more vacant houses in the following period, vt+1,a n d
consequently to a thicker market in the next period. We ﬁrst derive the case where the inequality
constraints are not binding, i.e. markets are open in both the cold and hot seasons.
The Planner’s solution when the housing market is open in all seasons
Because the sequence {φt}t=0,...alternates between φ
j and φ
j0
for seasons j,j0 = s,w, the planner’s
problem can be written recursively. Taking (qt−1,v t), and {φt}t=0,.. as given, and provided that the
solution is interior, that is, εt <v t, the Bellman equation for the planner is given by:
W (qt−1,v t,φ t)=m a x
εt
£









vt+1 = vtφt+1F (εt;vt)+1− φt+1.





































Using the envelope-theorem conditions, we obtain:





































where T1t ≡ ∂
∂vt [1 − F (εt;vt)] > 0 and T2t ≡ ∂
∂vt
R ¯ ε(vt)
εt xdF (x;vt) > 0. In the periodic steady state,










































































































































































and the stock of vacant houses, vj,j= s,w, satisﬁes (14) as in the decentralized economy.
T h et h i c k - m a r k e te ﬀect enters through two terms: T
j
1 ≡ ∂





εj xdF j (x) >
0.T h e ﬁrst term, T
j
1, indicates that the thick-market eﬀect shifts up the acceptance schedule
[1 − Fj (ε)]. The second term, T
j
2, indicates that the thick-market eﬀect increases the conditional
quality of transactions. The interior solution (44) is an implicit function of εj that depends on εj0,
vj,a n dvj0. It is not straightforward to derive an explicit condition for εj <v j,j= s,w. Abstract-
ing from seasonality for the moment, i.e. when φ
s = φ
w, it follows immediately from (14) that











1 − βφF (εp)+βφvT1
. (45)
Comparing (45) with (23), the thick-market eﬀect, captured by T1 and T2, generates two opposite
forces. The term T1 decreases εp, while the term T2 increases εp in the planner’s solution. Thus, the
positive thick-market eﬀect on the acceptance rate T1 implies that the number of transactions is too
low in the decentralized economy, while the positive eﬀect on quality T2 implies that the number of
transactions is too high. Since 1 − βφ is close to zero, however, the term T2 dominates. Therefore,
the overall eﬀect of the thick-market externality is to increase the number of transactions in the
decentralized economy relative to the eﬃcient outcome. As discussed in the text, comparing the
extent in seasonality in the decentralized equilibrium to the planner’s solution depends on the exact
distribution F (ε,v). We next derive the case in which the Planner ﬁnds it optimal to close down
the market in the cold season.
47The Planner’s solution when the housing market is closed in the cold season
Setting εw
t =¯ εw

















































































Intuitively, “a period” for the decision of εs
t is equal to 2t. The state variables for the current period












, and the control
variable is εs






























































































































































































































t [1 − Fs































































































































































w [Fs (εs) − vsTs
1]
, (52)




7.5 Model with unobservable match quality
Assume that the seller does not observe ε. As shown by Samuelson (1984), in bargaining between
informed and uninformed agents, the optimal mechanism is for the uninformed agent to make a
“take-it-or-leave” oﬀer. The same holds for the informed agent if it is optimal for him to make an
oﬀer at all. Hence, we adopt a simple price-setting mechanism: The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer pjv with probability θ ∈ [0,1] and the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer pjb with probability
1−θ.( θ =1corresponds to the case in which sellers post prices.) Broadly speaking, we can interpret
49θ as the “bargaining power” of the seller. The setup of the model implies that the buyer accepts
any oﬀer psv if Hs (ε) − psv > βBw; and the seller accepts any price psb > βV w + u. Let Ssi
v and
Ssi
b (ε) be the surplus of a transaction to the seller and the buyer when the match quality is ε and








b (ε) ≡ H
s (ε) − p
si − βB
w. (54)







i.e. the price is higher when the seller is making an oﬀer. Since only the buyer observes ε, a
transaction goes through only if Ssi
b (ε) > 0,i= b,v, i.e. a transaction goes through only if the
surplus to the buyer is non-negative regardless of who is making an oﬀer. Given Hs (ε) is increasing








1 − Fs (εsi) is thus the probability that a transaction is carried out. From (2), the response of the









Moreover, by the deﬁnition of Ssi

















7.5.1 The Seller’s oﬀer
Taking the reservation policy εsv of the buyer as given, the seller chooses a price to maximize the
expected surplus value of a sale:
max




The optimal price psv solves
[1 − F
s (ε





∂ps =0 . (59)
50Rearranging terms we obtain:











which makes clear that the price-setting problem of the seller is similar to that of a monopolist who
sets a markup equal to the inverse of the elasticity of demand (where demand in this case is given













Equation (60) says that the surplus to a seller generated by the transaction is higher when
1−Fs(εsv)
fs(εsv)
is higher, i.e. when the conditional probability that a successful transaction is of match quality εsv is
lower. Intuitively, the surplus of a transaction to a seller is higher when the house is transacted with
a stochastically higher match quality, or loosely speaking, when the distribution of match quality
has a “thicker” tail.
Given the price-setting mechanism, in equilibrium, the value of a vacant house to its seller is:
V
s = u + βV











[1 − Fs (εsv)]Ssv




which is the sum of the present discounted value of the ﬂow value u and the surplus terms when its
seller is making the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, which happens with probability θ.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition















7.5.2 The Buyer’s Oﬀer




sb = u + βV
w







2 [1 − Fs (εsv)]Ssv




51The buyer’s value function is:
B
s = βB

















b (ε) | ε > ε
sb¤
,
where Es [.] indicates the expectation taken with respect to the distribution Fs (.). Since the seller
does not observe ε, the expected surplus to the buyer is positive even when the seller is making the
oﬀer (which happens with probability θ). As said, buyers receive zero housing service ﬂow until they
ﬁnd a successful match. Solving out Bs explicitly,
B
















































v + u + V
w + βB
w, (67)
which equates the housing value of a marginal owner in season s, Hs (εs), to the sum of the surplus
generated to the seller (Ssi
v ), plus the sum of outside options for the buyer (βBw)a n dt h es e l l e r































The reservation quality εs depends on the sum of the outside options for buyers and sellers in both









































wb(ε) | ε > ε
wb¤ª
,
where Ssi (ε) ≡ Ssi
b (ε)+Ssi
v is the total surplus from a transaction with match quality ε. Note from







v . Also, because of the asymmetric information, the match is privately eﬃcient when the buyer is
making a price oﬀer.
52The thick-and-thin market equilibrium through the distribution Fj aﬀects the equilibrium prices
and reservation qualities
¡
pjv,p jb,ε jv,ε jb¢
in season j = s,w through two channels, as shown in (63),
(64), and(68)): The conditional density of the distribution at reservation εjv, i.e.
fj(εjv)
1−Fj(εjv), and the
expected surplus quality above reservation εjv,i . e . (1 − Fj (εji))Ej [ε − εji | ε > εji],i= b,v. As
shown in (60), a lower conditional probability that a transaction is of marginal quality εjv implies
higher expected surplus to the seller Sjv
v , which increases the equilibrium prices pjv and pjb in (63)
and (64). Similarly as shown in (58), a higher expected surplus quality above εjv (follows from (1))
implies a higher expected surplus to the buyer (1 − Fj (εji))Es [Ssi
b (ε) | ε > εsi],i= b,v. These two
channels aﬀect V j and Bj in (62) and (66), and as a result aﬀect the reservation qualities εjv and
εjb in (13).
7.5.4 Stock of vacant houses
In any season s, the average probability that a transaction goes through is
©
θ[1 − F s (εsv)] + (1 − θ)
£
1 − Fs ¡
εsb¢¤ª
, and the average probability that a transaction does not
through is
©
θFw (εwv)+( 1− θ)Fw ¡
εwb¢ª
. Hence, the law of motion for the stock of vacant houses
(and for the stock of buyers) is
v
























where the ﬁrst term includes houses that received a moving shock this season and the second term













that is, in equilibrium vs depends on the equilibrium reservation quality
¡
εwv,ε wb¢
a n do nt h e
distribution Fw (.).
An equilibrium is a vector
¡
psv,p sb,p wv,p wb,Bs + V s,Bw + V w,ε sv,ε sb,ε wv,ε wb,vs,v w¢
that jointly
satisﬁes equations (63),(66),(68), (69) and (70), with the surpluses Sj
v and S
j
b (ε) for j = s,w, derived












s {θFs (εsv)+( 1− θ)Fs (εsb)}{θFw (εwv)+( 1− θ)Fw (εwb)}
. (71)
Given 1 − φ
s > 1 − φ
w, as in the observable case, it follows that, in equilibrium vs >v w.




θ[1 − Fs (εsv)]psv +( 1− θ)psb
θ[1 − Fs (εsv)] + 1 − θ
be the average price observed in season s.G i v e npsv = Ssv




θ[1 − Fs (εsv)]Ssv
v








2 [1 − Fs (εsv)]Ssv
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Since the ﬂow u is a-seasonal, house prices are seasonal if θ>0 and the surplus to the seller is
seasonal. As in the case with observable match quality, when sellers have some “market power”
(θ>0), prices are seasonal. The extent of seasonality is increasing in the seller’s market power θ.
To see this, note that the equilibrium price is the discounted sum of the ﬂow value (u)p l u sap o s i t i v e
surplus from the sale. The surplus Ssv
v , as shown in (60), is seasonal. Given vs >v w, Assumption




1−Fs(x) for any cutoﬀ x,i . e .t h et h i c k - m a r k e te ﬀect
lowers the conditional probability that a successful transaction is of the marginal quality εsv in the
hot season, that is, it implies a “thicker” tail in quality in the hot season. In words, the quality
of matches goes up in the summer and hence buyers’ willingness to pay increases; sellers can then
extract a higher surplus in the summer; thus, Ssv
v >S wv
v .A s i n t h e c a s e w i t h o b s e r v a b l e ε,t h e r e
is an equilibrium eﬀect through the seasonality of cutoﬀs. As shown in (68), the equilibrium cutoﬀ
εsv depends on the surplus to the seller (Ssv
v ) and on the sum of the seller’s and the buyer’s outside
options, while the equilibrium cutoﬀ εsb depends only on the sum of the outside options. The
seasonality in outside options tends to reduce εsi/εwi for i = b,v. This is because the outside option
in the hot season s is determined by the sum of values in the winter season: Bw+V w, which is lower
than in the summer. However, the seasonality in the surplus term, Ssv
v >S wv
v (shown before), tends
to increase εsv/εwv (the marginal house has to be of higher quality in order to generate a bigger
54surplus to the seller). Because of these two opposing forces, the equilibrium eﬀect is likely to be
small (even smaller than in the observable case.)
Given that θ aﬀects Ssv
v only through the equilibrium vacancies and reservation qualities, it
follows that the extent of seasonality in price is increasing in θ.
7.5.6 Seasonality in Transactions













(An isomorphic expression holds for Qw). As in the observables case, seasonality in transactions
stems from three sources. First, the direct eﬀect from a larger stock of vacancies in the summer,
vs >v w.S e c o n dt h ea m p l i ﬁcation through the thick-market eﬀects that shifts up the probability of
a transaction. Third, there is an equilibrium eﬀect through cutoﬀs. As pointed out before, this last
eﬀect is small. As in the case with observable ε, most of the ampliﬁcation stems from the thick-
market eﬀect. What is new when ε is unobservable is that the extent of seasonality in transactions
is decreasing in the seller’s market market power θ. This is because higher θ leads to higher surplus
in the summer relative to winter, Ssv
v /Swv
v , w h i c hi nt u r ni n c r e a s e sεsv/εwv and hence decreases
Qs/Qw); the higher is θ, the stronger is this eﬀect (it disappear when θ =0 ).
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